Criminal Evidence: Affordable Learning Grant

Chapter 3 of Criminal Procedure: Undergraduate Edition

The defendant was arrested by a police officer, so far as the record shows, without warrant, at the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri, where he was employed by an express company.

The precise question for consideration is this: does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the “due process of law” required by the Fourteenth Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed to be an infraction of the Fourth Amendment as applied in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383?

Having “some information that [the petitioner here] was selling narcotics,” three deputy sheriffs of the County of Los Angeles, on the morning of July 1, 1949, made for the two-story dwelling house in which Rochin lived with his mother, common law wife, brothers and sisters.

Appellant stands convicted of knowingly having had in her possession and under her control certain lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs in violation of § 2905.34 of Ohio’s Revised Code.

We decide whether violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule requires the suppression of all evidence found in the search.

This case presents the question whether evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment by an officer who acted in reliance on a police record indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant-a record that is later determined to be erroneous-must be suppressed by virtue of the exclusionary rule regardless of the source of the error.

The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches and seizures,” and this usually requires the police to have probable cause or a warrant before making an arrest.

Even if a criminal defendant has standing to invoke the exclusionary rule, not all evidence found as a result of police violating the defendant’s constitutional rights will be excluded.

To enforce the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures,” this Court has at times required courts to exclude evidence obtained by unconstitutional police conduct.

The use of rap lyrics as evidence against artists is a pervasive problem that distorts the meaning and purpose of the art and creates an unacceptable risk of wrongful prosecutions. Creative expression, especially expression that challenges status-quo political, social, and economic arrangements, is at the heart of First Amendment values.

Artistic freedom is a right afforded under the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment; however, many rap artists that run afoul of the law have had their lyrics held against them in a court of law.

The admissibility of rap lyrics and videos as evidence is often framed as a legal matter, but is it?

When a defendant seeks to exclude evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the constitution, the judge normally decides the suppression motion by preponderance of the evidence.

Much as members of the public commonly overestimate the role of the exclusionary rule in freeing guilty defendants on “technicalities,” public opinion also overestimates the availability of money damages to the victims of police misconduct.

Petitioner Andrew Kisela, a police officer in Tucson, Arizona, shot respondent Amy Hughes.

The Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office now concedes that, in prosecuting respondent John Thompson for attempted armed robbery, prosecutors failed to disclose evidence that should have been turned over to the defense under Brady v. Maryland.

The chapter analyzes the rationales for excluding relevant evidence with the aim of establishing the ideal type of exclusion system for each rationale. The authors then review to what extent individual legal systems have actually altered their legal rules in accordance with these ideal systems. An investigation into whether or not there are any consistent relationships between the ideal systems and proclaimed rationales is conducted. The structure of various exclusionary rules is also explored, as are other factors that may influence the law and practical application of such rules.

This chapter explores whether exclusionary rules serve as efficient tools to streamline criminal procedure in a way that safeguards the rights of an accused or whether they exist merely as law on the books with limited actual utility. Relevant benchmarks for the evaluation of exclusionary rules are discussed, in addition to their structure. The question of which characteristics of exclusionary rules optimize the protection of procedural rights is analyzed along with other options to prevent violations. Possible alternatives to exclusionary rules are suggested to help answer the question: Is it time for a change?

Does a court violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal defendant by introducing evidence obtained through a police search based on an arrest warrant that should have been recalled, but was negligently allowed to remain active, at the time of the search?

Does the Fourth Amendment require the suppression of evidence viewed in plain sight prior to an illegal entry that was later discovered in the course of a properly warranted search?